Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (2003) warn that persistence in expected returns generates spurious regression bias in predictive regressions of stock returns, even though stock returns are themselves only weakly autocorrelated. Despite this fact a growing literature attempts to explain the performance of stock market anomalies with highly persistent investor sentiment. The data suggest, however, that the potential misspecification bias may be large. Predictive regressions of real returns on simulated regressors are too likely to reject the null of independence, and it is far too easy to find real variables that have "significant power" predicting returns. Standard OLS predictive regressions find that the party of the U.S. President, cold weather in Manhattan, global warming, the El Niño phenomenon, atmospheric pressure in the Arctic, the conjunctions of the planets, and sunspots, all have "significant power" predicting the performance of anomalies. These issues appear particularly acute for anomalies prominent in the sentiment literature, including those formed on the basis of size, distress, asset growth, investment, profitability, and idiosyncratic volatility.
Introduction
Investor sentiment is increasingly used as a variable to predict the performance of trading strategies. Baker and Wurgler (2006) , Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) , and Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) find that investor sentiment has significant power predicting the performance of small, young, volatile and unprofitable stocks; momentum; firms that issue large amounts of equity; and a host of earnings and investment related anomalies. Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) find that recent past market performance, an important determinant of investor sentiment, predicts the profitability of momentum strategies. These papers all test for a relation between the predictive variable (e.g., investor sentiment, or past market performance) and the expected returns to some trading strategy (e.g., value, or momentum), and strongly reject the null that the strategy's expected returns are independent of the predictive variable. They conclude that the predictive variable has significant power forecasting the the strategy's performance.
An alternative explanation is that the tests are simply misspecified. If a trading strategy's expected returns vary slowly over time, then OLS regressions confer spurious power explaining returns on any slow moving "predictive variable." Time variation in risk premia introduces auto correlation in the returns data, though this is largely obscured by the high variability of returns. Standard "predictive regressions," which purport to test for a relation between the performance of an anomaly and some explanatory variable, report more power than they actually have to reject the null of independence. Persistence in expected returns and the explanatory variable reduce the number of effective observations, and test statistics calculated ignoring this fact overstate the test's power. Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (2003) show that the spurious regression bias of Granger and Newbold (1974) can be severe when studying return predictability, despite the fact that returns are first differences in prices and exhibit little persistence. 1 Because returns exhibit little persistence, the finance literature often ignores the potential bias towards rejecting independence. Predictive regressions do not, however, test for a relation between the predictive variable and returns. They test for a relation between the predictive variable and the expected returns (a level), which may be far more persistent. Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (2003) show in simulations that if returns are noisy realizations of an auto regressive expected returns process, then independent autoregressive "news" precesses, which by construction contain absolutely no information about expected returns, frequently appear to have power in sample. Predictive regressions, which regress realized returns on the independent news process, are too likely to reject the hypothesis of independence. This spurious regression bias interacts with and intensifies the data mining concerns of Foster, Smith, and Whaley (1997) . Mining is more likely to uncover spurious, persistent regressors, and the regressors used in the literature to predict stock market performance tend to be persistent, suggesting that the power of some of these regressors is spurious. 2 Similar biases are observed when "predicting" the performance of real world anomalies with simulated regressors. Predictive regressions are biased toward rejecting the indepen- 1 This problem is distinct from that solved by Stambaugh (1999) . Stambaugh (1999) derives the small sample properties of the OLS estimators for well specified regressions of returns on a slow moving predictor. 2 Prominent persistent regressors used to predict market returns include short term interest rates (Fama and Schwert 1977) , credit spreads (Keim and Stambaugh 1986) , the term structure slope (Campbell 1987) , stock volatility (French, Schwert and Stambaugh 1987) , and the aggregate dividend yield (Fama and French 1988) . More recently Baker and Wurgler (2000) find that the equity share of new issuance predicts market performance, while Lettau and Lugvigson (2001) and Lamont and Stein (2004) find similar results using the consumption-wealth-ratio and aggregate short interest.
dence of the performance of a wide variety of investment strategies and independently generated noise with a persistent component. As a result it is much too easy to find "powerful" conditioning variables in the real world. The party of the U.S. President, the weather in Manhattan (or pretty much anywhere), global warming, the El Niño phenomenon, atmospheric pressure in the Arctic, the conjunctions of the planets, and sunspots, all have "significant power" predicting the performance of well known anomalies. The strategies prominent in the sentiment literature, including those formed on the basis of size, distress, asset growth, investment, profitability, and idiosyncratic volatility, appear particularly susceptible to the "predictive power" of obviously independent regressors. This is not to say that the economic explanations provided in earlier papers for the observed correlations between sentiment, or past market performance, and the performance of market anomalies are incorrect. Many of these papers provide additional evidence, by investigating deeper implications of the proposed relation, such as asymmetries between the power that the conditioning variable has to predict the performance of the long and short side of the investment strategy. But all the tests employed in these papers, including these additional tests, are likely misspecified, and thus overstate the power the tests have to reject the null hypothesis that the predictive variable investigated is actually unrelated to the performance of the strategies.
An Illustration
The potential biases that arise from misspecification can be seen most easily in simulations, like those considered in Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (2003) . If expected returns follow an AR(1), then predictive regressions of realized returns on AR(1) noise processes with similar mean reversion rates are too likely to reject the null of independence. Suppose that returns are noisy realizations of expected returns, and that the expected return ( t ) and a "news" (x t ) follow independent AR(1) processes with the same persistence a 1 ,
where the Regressions of returns on lagged news, however, are too likely to reject the hypothesis of independence. Figure 1 shows test statistics on the slope coefficient on the explanatory variable from misspecified predictive regressions of returns on the lagged "news" process,
The figure shows the test statistics on the slope coefficient for a million simulations of forty years of monthly data. The monthly persistence on the AR(1) process is a 1 D 0:985 (a half-life to shocks to the average return process of 3.82 years), slightly less than the monthly autocorrelation observed in the Baker-Wurgler Index, and the shocks to the aver- that observed in the aggregate stock market, roughly 10%. The figure shows the realized test statistics, in bins of width of 0.01. The distribution is basically normal with a SD of 2.29, implying the precision with which the slopes are estimated is overstated by more than a factor of two. The predictive regression is far too likely to reject the null that the "news" process is unrelated to returns, despite the fact that the two processes are independent by construction. The misspecified OLS regressions reject the hypothesis that returns are unrelated to AR(1) noise at the 5% level 39% of the time.
The standard deviation of test statistics in the misspecified regressions depends on the persistence of the shocks (i.e., the mean reversion speed of expected returns), and the relative magnitudes of the shocks to the expected return process and the returns process. More persistence in the expected return process, or a higher signal-to-noise ratio ( = ), increase the autocorrelation in returns, magnifying the extent to which the precision of the slope coefficient in the predictive regression is over estimated. 
Predicting real strategy performance with noise
Predictive regressions also tend to over-reject the null of independence for real anomaly returns. We can guarantee independence between anomaly strategy returns and a predictive variable by again simulating the predictive variable completely independently. Figure   3 shows results of regressions similar to those presented in the last section, which regress the returns to real market anomalies on simulated AR(1) noise. The dependent variables employed in the regressions are the returns to well known anomalies: a value strategy, an investment strategy, the asset growth strategy of Cooper, Gulen and Schill (2008) , and the 12-month strategy of Heston and Sadka (2008) . The strategies are constructed by sorting on book-to-market, investment (the change in property, plant and equipment plus the change in inventories)-to-assets, assets-to-lagged assets, and average stock performance in the same calendar month over the previous five years. All four strategies are long/short extreme deciles of a sort on the corresponding sorting variable, using NYSE breaks. Returns are value weighted. The value, investment, and asset growth portfolios are rebalanced at the end of July, while those based on seasonality are rebalanced monthly. The sample cov- These results are not specific to the AR(1) assumption on the predictive noise process. Figure 4 repeats the exercise using AR(2) noise as the predictive variable. Each predictive series is generated using
where the coefficients a 1 and a 2 are chosen so that the autocorrelation coefficients are pseudo-periodic, and the i are independent normally distributed shocks. I consider scenarios in which a 2 2 . 1; :9/, implying a periodic (monthly) damping coefficient (i.e., The figure shows the standard deviation of test statistics from predictive regressions of the returns to strategies sorted on book-to-market, investment-to-assets, asset growth, and average stock performance in the same calendar month over the previous five years, onto independent AR(1) noise. The figure shows test statistic standard deviations for monthly persistence in the auto regressive noise process of a 1 2 OE0:9; 0:995, implying half-lives to shocks of six months to 11.5 years. Each standard deviation is estimated from 100,000 noise series. The sample covers July 1973 to December 2010.
The top panel shows results predicting the performance of real investment strategies based on size, long run past performance, and two distress strategies, using an AR(2) noise with a periodicity of one year. These strategies are constructed by sorting on size (end of year market capitalization), stock performance from three to one years prior, the failure probability measure of Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), and the default risk (2008) and Ohlson (1980) , onto independent AR(2) noise with an annual periodicity, and 2) the returns to the Fama-French market and momentum factors (MTK and UMD) and strategies sorted on net stock issuance and return-on-equity, onto independent AR(2) noise with a biannual periodicity. The figure shows test statistic standard deviations for a 2 2 . 1; 0:95/. Each test-statistic standard distribution is estimated from 100,000 noise series. The sample covers July 1973 to December 2010.
"O-score" of Ohlson (1980) . These strategies are again long/short extreme value weighted deciles of a sort on the corresponding sorting variable, using NYSE breaks. The size portfolios are rebalanced at the end of July, while the strategies based on long run past performance, failure probability, and Ohlson's O-score are rebalanced monthly. The sample covers July 1973 to December 2010. Again, predictive regressions are too likely to reject the hypothesis of independence.
The bottom panel shows similar results for the returns to the market, UMD (the "upminus-down" momentum factor maintained by Ken French), and strategies based on net stock issuance and return-on-equity (ROE), employing AR(2) noise with a periodicity of two years as the predictive variables. The ROE and issuance strategies are constructed by sorting on income before extraordinary items divided by market equity, and net stock issuance to market equity, respectively, and are again long/short extreme value weighted deciles sorted using NYSE breaks. The issuance portfolios are rebalanced at the end of July, while the ROE strategy is rebalanced monthly. The sample covers July 1973 to December 2010. The predictive regressions again overstate the power they have to reject the hypothesis of independence.
Spurious correlations in the data
This section takes the exercise one step further, predicting the returns to real strategies using real "predictive" variables. The results suggest that it is far too easy to find variables that have "significant power" in standard OLS predictive regressions. The party of the sitting U.S. President, cold weather in Manhattan, global warming, the El Niño phenomenon, atmospheric pressure in the Arctic, the conjunctions of the planets, and sunspots, all have "significant power" predicting the performance of a wide array of well known anomalies. Figure 5 shows the "predictive" variables used in the first set of regressions, a dummy for whether the sitting U.S. President is a Democrat. The sample covers January 1961 (Kennedy's inauguration) to December 2010. Table 1 months that begin with a Republican in the Oval Office, while the market has beaten T-Bills by a highly significant 89 basis points per month in months that started with a Democratic Commander-in-Chief. This 79 basis points per month difference is significant at the 5% level.
Predicting anomaly performance with political parties
Over the same period the smallest decile of stocks (NYSE breaks) has outperformed the largest decile, on a value weighted basis, by 35 basis points per month. This outperformance has, however, come unevenly through time. Small stocks have beaten large stocks by almost a percent per month with Democratic presidents, but actually underperformed large stocks by 10 basis points per month during Republican administrations. The 104 These results are all robust to controlling for sentiment. Including the Baker-Wurgler
Index as an explanatory variable has essentially no impact on the coefficient estimates on the presidential dummy in the predictive regressions.
Predicting anomaly performance with the weather
While it is not entirely impossible that the sitting president can significantly impact market performance, it seems less likely that the weather can do so. Nevertheless, in standard predictive regressions weather-related variables are powerful predictors of anomaly performance. quarterly CompuStat data used in the construction of many of the test strategies. Table 2 shows that cold weather has power predicting the performance of many of the same anomalies as investor sentiment. Cold weather predicts abnormally good performance for small cap strategies, value strategies, strategies based on asset growth and investment, and strategies based on long run reversals. It has significant power predicting abnormally poor performance for many earnings related anomalies, including those based on industry adjusted gross profitability, return on assets, return on equity, gross margins, and earnings returns. Taken together these results suggest a seasonality in the performance of many anomaly strategies. A sine wave with an annual periodicity that takes its extremum on the equinox "predicts" the performance of many of the weather related anomalies about as well as cold days in New York. The appendix shows that these results are largely due to a strong January effect, like that documented by Keim (1983) and Reinganum (1983) for small stocks, which is present in many of the anomalies considered here. Table 6 , in the Appendix, shows results of regressions of anomaly returns on a January dummy. In general strategies that tend to be long small caps (e.g., those based on book-to-market, asset growth or long run past performance) outperform on average in January, while those that tend to be short small caps (e.g., momentum strategies, those based on any measure of profitability, and those that sell distressed firms) underperform on average in January. While these results are interesting in and of themselves, their relevance here stems from their implications for the predictive regressions. Predictive regressions that ignore the seasonality in these anomalies are misspecified, and biased toward rejecting the irrelevance of any "predictive" variable that has a seasonable component.
Other climatic predictors
While variables with a seasonal component are powerful predictors of anomaly performance, non-seasonal climatic variables are also have significant power predicting anomaly performance. Figure 7 shows the evolution of our next set of predictive variables, the shows that global warming is bad for value strategies, both those based on book-to-market and earnings-to-price, even after controlling for sentiment. A 12-month moving average of the global temperature anomaly, which takes out its seasonal component, also predicts poor stock price performance for firms that invest a lot, but good performance for firms with market power, though the power of the variable to predict the performance of this last strategy appears to come form its common variation with sentiment. 
Celestial predictors of anomaly performance
The planets and stars are also powerful predictors of anomaly performance. Both the planetary aspects (i.e., the apparent proximity of two planets in the heavens to an earth observer) and sunspot activity are powerful predictors of anomaly performance. These anomalies again include many of those prominent in the sentiment literature.
The aspects of Mercury and Venus with the outer planets appear to be particularly important in the data for the performance of anomalies, predicting the performance of strategies based on market cap, book-to-market, momentum, gross profitability, return-onassets, market power, earnings surprises, failure probability, default probability, idiosyncratic volatility, asset growth, and long run reversals. The aspects of the inner planets with the outer planets have periodicities of roughly a year, however, so it is difficult to distin- Panel B shows that strategies based on market cap, net stock issuance, asset growth, and investment all perform better when Jupiter and Saturn are opposed. These data suggest that Table 4 . Celestial phenomena and anomaly strategy performance This table reports the average excess returns (EOEr e ) in percent per month, and results of predictive regressions of the strategies returns on predictive variables (PV), the angle between Mars and Saturn to an earth observer, the angle between Jupiter and Saturn to an earth observer, and the observed number of sunspots, controlling for investor sentiment as measured by the Baker-Wurgler Index (BWI). Explanatory variables are demeaned. The sample covers July 1973 through December 2010, dates determined by the availability of quarterly accounting data employed in many of the strategies' construction. polarization between Jupiter and Saturn may portend difficulties with growth, and should perhaps be taken as a sign to delay plans for rapid expansion. The aspect of Jupiter and Saturn also explains more than ten percent of the variation in the Baker-Wurgler Index, but this seems largely unrelated to the power that either series has predicting anomaly performance. Regressions that employ both variables in all cases yield slope estimates that are similar to their univariate estimates.
Panel C shows that sunspots are a significant predictor of the performance of strategies based on both price and earnings momentum. High levels of solar activity seem to increase investors' propensity to underreact, slowing down the rate at which news gets incorporated into prices. Strategies that trade on recent past performance and earnings surprises consequently have returns that are significantly positively correlated with the number of sunspots observed in the previous month. These results are again robust to controlling for sentiment.
The total number of sunspots observed over the preceding solar cycle (125-months) also has significant power predicting anomaly performance. This number, which measures the amplitude of the last solar cycle, as opposed to where one is in the cycle, predicts the performance strategies based on market capitalization, Ohlson's O-score, and seasonalities in stock performance. Unusually intense solar cycles seem to predict poor performance for small caps, but strong performance for strategies that bet on stocks that performed well in the same calendar month in preceding years, or against high default probability stocks.
These results cannot be explained by investor sentiment, while much of investor sentiment's power to explain the performance of small cap strategies appears to be explained by its correlation with the intensity of the preceding solar cycle.
Alternative Tests
While the preceding sections clearly illustrate the potential for spurious regression bias even when working with returns, they provide no guidance to the researcher interested in running predictive regressions. Plosser and Schwert (1978) suggest that comparisons between regressions run in levels and differences provide a crude test of model specification.
First differences in realized returns provide a noisy proxy for changes is expected returns, which are much less persistent than their level, alleviating spurious regression bias concerns. First-differencing greatly reduces the variation in the predictive variable, however, without reducing the variation in realized returns, lowering the signal to noise ratio and yielding less powerful tests. While regressions run in first differences are more likely to be well specified, realistic samples are not large enough to allow regressions run in differences to identify significant return relations. Similar limitations apply to other standard methods for handling persistent regressors. Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (2008) find that available return series are too short to admit sufficient lags to correct the spurious regression bias using the Newey-West procedure, and lagged returns are a poor instrument for the persistence in excess returns. The extensive literature on small-sample distributions offers no solutions, because the problem is ultimately one of potential misspecification.
Without an obvious methodological correction for potential misspecification bias, the econometrician running predictive regressions should at least report results from simulations using similarly persistent regressors. If one admits the possibility that expected returns are persistent, but vary over time for reasons potentially unrelated to the predictive variable, then inferring significance directly from standard test-statistics is impossible.
Results cannot be considered significant if the test-statistic observed on the predictive variable is not unusual among similarly persistent predictors. Statistical significance requires that the observed test-statistic is extreme in the empirical distribution of test-statistics from predictive regressions using random regressors with autocorrelation structures similar to that observed in the candidate predictive variable. Note that this is only a necessary condition, not sufficient condition, for true significance. Reporting these results does not fully address concerns regarding spurious regression bias, as it is always possible that the auto- deviation of the empirical distribution of test-statistics from tests employing randomly generated regressors. The test-statistics on the estimated slope coefficients on BWI are adjusted using the empirical distribution from tests employing the pseudo-periodic AR(2) regressors with a periodicity of 187 months shown in Figure 9 . Those on MKT 60;1 are adjusted using the empirical distribution from tests employing a 60-month moving average of white noise, a good approximation of realized five year log returns. In the multiple regressions the simulated regressors are generated using the same shocks, to reflect the fact that market sentiment and past market performance are positively correlated in the data.
The table shows that while market sentiment appears to have more power than the random regressors predicting the performance of the strategy based on idiosyncratic volatility Strategies that perform better when sentiment is low and earnings related anomalies (i.e., those formed on the basis of industry adjusted gross profitability, return-on-assets, failure probability, and default probability), its power to predict the performance of strategies based on size, net stock issuance, market power, and seasonality is unremarkable among similarly persistent random regressors. Similar results hold using past market performance as the predictive variable. Past market performance additionally appears to have more power than a 60-month moving average of white noise predicting the performance of both price and earnings momentum, but its power to predict the performance of value is unremarkable among similarly persistent random regressors.
The table also shows that the power BWI has predicting the performance of the earnings related anomalies, including those formed on the basis of failure and default probabilities, is largely explained by its correlation with past market performance.
Conclusion
When expected returns are persistent, then misspecified predictive regressions are biased toward rejecting the independence of returns and any persistent variable. The data suggest that these concerns are more than theoretical. Predictive regressions of real anomaly returns on persistent variables frequently find a significant relation, even when the two series are clearly unrelated.
Running predictive regressions in first difference is much safer. These regressions have less power, and are consequently less attractive to those seeking to find significant predictive variables, but have the enormous advantage of yielding meaningful answers. The misspecified regression bias is ultimately just an issue of power. Persistence in expected returns reduces the number of effective observations, and ignoring this fact results in test that overstate the significance of their results. It is simply harder to find variables that truly have power to predict anomaly performance than it is to find variables that appear to have power in misspecified OLS regressions.
A Appendix: Additional Tables 
